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Abstract—While our conventional cryptography methods, such 
for AES (encryption), SHA-256 (hashing) and RSA/Elliptic Curve 
(signing), work well on systems which have reasonable processing 
power and memory capabilities, these do not scale well into a 
world with embedded systems and sensor networks. Thus 
lightweight cryptography methods are proposed to overcome 
many of the problems of conventional cryptography. This includes 
constraints related to physical size, processing requirements, 
memory limitation and energy drain. This paper outlines many of 
the techniques that are defined as replacements for conventional 
cryptography within an Internet of Things (IoT) space and discuss 
some trends in the design of lightweight algorithms. 
Index Terms— Lightweight cryptography, Resource limited 
devices, encryption, Hashing functions. PHOTON, SPONGENT, 
Lesamanta-LW, Enocoro, Trivium, PRESENT, CLEFIA 
I. INTRODUCTION
While AES and SHA work well together within computer 
systems, they struggle in an IoT/embedded world as they take 
up: too much processing power; too much physical space; and 
consume too much battery power. In the last decade, a large 
number of lightweight cryptography primitives have been 
proposed and used over resource-limited devices. Both the 
national (NIST) and international (ISO/IEC) organizations 
outline a number of methods which can be used for lightweight 
cryptography, and which could be useful in IoT and RFID 
devices [1]. They define the device spectrum as: 
 Conventional cryptography. Servers and Desktops.
Tablets and smart phones.
 lightweight cryptography. Embedded Systems. RFID and
Sensor Networks.
With embedded systems, we commonly see 8-bit, 16-bit and 
32-bit microcontrollers, and which would struggle to cope with
real-time demands for conventional cryptography methods.
And in the 40+ years since the first 4-bit processor, there is even
a strong market for 4-bit processors. RFID and sensor network
devices, especially, have limited numbers of gates available for
security, and are often highly constrained with the power drain
on the device.
So AES is often a non-starter for many embedded devices. In 
lightweight cryptography, we often see smaller block size 
(typically 64 bits or 80 bits), smaller keys (often less than 90 
bits) and less complex rounds (and where the S-boxes often just 
have 4-bits). Along with this it has been identified as having 
weaknesses our side channel attacks. In [2], the researchers 
attack a 128-bit AES key on an Arduino device using 
differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power 
analysis (CPA), and crack it within 30 minutes. 
For lightweight cryptography, the main constraints that we 
have are typically related to power requirements, gate 
equivalents (GEs), and timing. With passive RFID devices, we 
do not have an associated battery for the power supply, and 
where the chip must power itself from energy coupled from the 
radio wave. An RFID device is thus likely to be severely 
constrained in the power drain associated with any 
cryptography functions, along with being constrained for the 
timing requirements and for the number of gates used. Even if 
an RFID device has an associated battery (active RFID), it may 
be difficult to recharge the battery, so the drain on power must 
often be minimised. 
On the other hand, the IoT are unleashing the next wave of 
innovations due to its inherent capability of connecting 
intelligent ‘things’ in a physical world into cloud-based 
information technology architecture. The data and privacy 
protection in IoT is fundamental to the success of IoT and it will 
present new security challenges in cryptographic security, 
credentialing, and identity management [3].   
There is thus often a compromise between the cryptography 
method used and the overall security of the method. Thus often 
lightweight cryptography methods balance performance 
(throughput) against power drain and GE, and do not perform 
as well as main-stream cryptography standards (such as AES 
and SHA-256). Along with this the method must also have a 
low requirement for RAM (where the method requires the usage 
of running memory to perform its operation) and ROM (where 
the method is stored on the device). In order to assess the 
strengths of various methods we often define the area that the 
cryptography function will use on the device – and which is 
defined in µm2. 
In the Internet of Things (IoT), many interconnected resource 
constrained devices are not designed to carry out expensive 
conventional cryptographic computation, which makes it 
difficult to implement sufficient cryptographic functions. To 
guarantee security and privacy protection in the IoT becomes a 
serious concern when integrating resource constrained devices 
into the IoT securely since they are incapable of carrying out 
sufficient cryptographic algorithms [3].  
In recent, the lightweight symmetric cryptography has been 
developed for IoT, including hash functions and MACs like 
Quark, Marvin, and block/streaming ciphers such as 
PRESENT, SPONGENT, and so on. Asymmetric cryptography 
that can be used for IoT includes number-theoretic 
cryptography, such as ECC, PBC, etc., post-quantum 
cryptography lattices and codes [4]. Since most IoT devices are 
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working on a multi-task mode, so the software performance is 
crucial for the lightweight cryptography and existing 
lightweight solutions such as Chaskey, FLY, LEA, SPARX, 
etc. show good evaluation results [5]. In the IoT case, the cipher 
types, block size, key size, relevant attacks, etc. should be taken 
into considerations.  
In the lightweight cryptanalysis, typical attacks include 
single-key/related-key, distinguisher/key-recovery, weak-keys, 
meet-in-the-middle-attack, etc. In [4], a lightweight crypto-
analysis model is addressed to against generic attacks. For 
lightweight cryptography, the size of key, block and tag are 
usually considered in cryptanalysis, specifically, for multi-key 
attacks, power of precomputation, brute-force attacks, etc. In 
many cases, the applicability over resourced-limited devices are 
crucial. 
In the past decade, a number of lightweight cryptography 
protocols, algorithms, and primitives have been standardized as 
the ISO/ICE 29121. For security communication, the 
lightweight primitives have been embedded into existing 
protocols, such as IPSec, TLS, and a number of embedded 
cryptography libraries have been released such as wolfSSL, 
CyaSSL, sharkSSL, RELIC, etc.  
II. CHALLENGES IN LIGHTWEIGHT CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Lightweight cryptography targets a very wide variety of 
resource constrained devices such as IoT end nodes and RFID 
tags [6] that can be implemented on both hardware and software 
with different communication technologies. It is very difficult 
for resource-limited environment to implement the standard 
cryptographic algorithms due to the implementation size, speed 
or throughput, and energy-consumption. The lightweight 
cryptography trade-offs implementation cost, speed, security, 
performance, and energy consumption on resource-limited 
devices. The motivation of lightweight cryptography is to use 
less memory, less computing resource, less power supply to 
provide security solution that can work over resource-limited 
devices. The lightweight cryptography is expected simpler and 
faster compare to conventional cryptography. The disadvantage 
of lightweight cryptography is less secured [6].  
A. Hardware Implementation 
In hardware implementation of the lightweight cryptography 
primitives, the code size, the memory consumption (RAM), and 
energy consumption are the important metrics. To well evaluate 
the lightweight cryptography, the exact type of circuit (such as 
the clock), memory, storing of the internal states and key states 
should be taken into consideration. However, it does not mean 
shorter block and key size are better since it may cause insecure 
against related-key attacks [6]. In some case, the read-only 
‘Mask’ technology is used to burn keys into devices (chips) to 
reduce the key space. In recent, in [7] an energy efficiency of 
hardware implementation metric is proposed, in which the 
latency is used to evaluate the time taken to perform a given 
operation [8].     
B. Software Implementation  
In software implementation case, the implementation size, and 
RAM consumption, and the throughput (bytes per cycle) are 
preferable metrics for the lightweight applications [5]. The 
smaller the better. In software cases, the unified FELICS (Fair 
Evaluation of lightweight Cryptographic Systems) framework 
is proposed to evaluate the performances of lightweight block 
or stream ciphers’ performances in implementation size, RAM 
consumption, and time taken to perform a given operation [9].  
Table 1 shows the FELICS results of popular lightweight cipher 
algorithms for three different implementations: 8-bit AVR, 6-
bit MSP, and 32-bit ARM. 
Due to the circuit implementation, the implementation size, 
RAM consumption and the throughput are not independent and 
reduce the number of operations can decrease both memory and 
time consumption [6][9].  
 
Table 1. FELICS results for lightweight ciphers [6] 
 
C. Lightweight Cryptography Design Trends 
Based on metrics discussed both in hardware case and software 
case, most lightweight algorithms are designed to use smaller 
internal states, short block and key sizes. Indeed, most 
lightweight block ciphers use only 64 bit blocks (AES is 
demanded a 128-bit block and a 128-bit key). The lightweight 
implementation usually leads smaller RAM consumption and it 
is good at processing smaller messages as well. In designing 
lightweight cryptography solutions, following trends are 
noticed:  (1) Short block and key size will bring problems: short 
block can cause problems such as CBC erodes faster than other 
part when the number of n-bit blocks encrypted approaches 2n/2 
[9], meanwhile the short key size can increase the risks of key-
related attacks [3]; (2) The number of operations in symmetric 
lightweight cryptography roughly doubles when the input size 
of a symmetric-key primitive double [5]. In PHOTON family, 
the number of rounds is always 12, the number of S-box doubles 
if the size doubles. Similarly, in AES 256, the number of rounds 
is 14, the number of s-box doubles if the block size doubles; (3) 
The lightweight cryptography always is driven by the 
applications; as a result, lightweight primitives should be 
designed to apply new academic insights as well as to best 
match existing protocols.  
III. METHODS 
For lightweight cryptography PHOTON [10], SPONGENT  [4] 
and Lesamanta-LW [11] are defined as standards for hashing 
methods within ISO/IEC 29192-5:2016, PRESENT and 
CLEFIA for block methods within ISO/IEC 29192-2:2012, and 
Enocoro and Trivium for stream methods within ISO/IEC 
29192-3:2012. 
A. Hashing 
While we will all have 32-bit or 64-bit processors in our mobile 
phones and desktops, and have much more the 1GB of memory, 
in an IoT world we often measure memory capacity in just a 
few KiloBytes (KB), and where 8-bit processors rule the roost. 
The cost of a simple 8-bit processor can be defined in 10s of 
cents, compared with hundreds of dollars for our complex 
processors. And so our crypto hash functions for MD5 and 
SHA-1, and most of our other modern hash methods, are just 
not efficient for IoT devices. NIST have thus recommended 
new hashing methods such SPONGENT, PHOTON, Quark and 
Lesamnta-LW. These methods produce a much smaller 
memory footprint, and have a target an input of just 256 
characters (whereas typically hash functions support up to 264 
bits). 
SPONGENT uses the sponge function (Figure 1) [4].  With 
the sponge construction, we use a fixed-length permutation (or 
transformation) and a padding rule. This construction thus takes 
a variable length input and map it to a variable-length output. 
The input is (Z2)* of any length and then converts it into (Z2)n, 
where n is defined as part of the process. Overall the method 
uses a finite-state machine process, and iterates through the 
states with the addition of the input data. The concept of sponge 
function was created Bertoni, who created Keccak  [12]. They 
can use either use a publicly known unkeyed permutation (P-
Sponge) or with a random function (T-Sponge). Along with 




Figure 1 Sponge function [4] 
 
The sponge construction uses a function f which has a 
variable-length input and a defined output length. It operates on 
a fixed number of bits (b) - the width. The sponge construction 
then operates on a state of b=r+c bits. r is defined as the bitrate 
and c as the capacity (Figure 1). Initially an input string is 
padded using a reversible padding rule (such as adding NULL 
characters), and then segmented into blocks of r bits. Next the 
b bits of the state are set to zero, and the sponge construction 
next defines: 
 
 Absorbing phase. This is where the r-bit input blocks are 
X-ORed into the first r bits of the state, interleaved with 
applications of the function f. After all the input blocks 
have been processed, we then move to a squeezing phase. 
 Squeezing phase. This is where the first r bits of the state 
are outputted as blocks and, interleaved with the function 
f. The number of bits of the output are defined as part of 
the process. 
 
Overall the last c bits of a state are never changed by the input 
blocks and never output within the squeezing phase. For an 88-
bit hash we have (SPONGENT-088-080-00 - Spongent-
88/80/8: n=88 bits, b=88 bits, c=80 bits, r=8 bits, R=45) and for 
128-bit (SPONGENT-128-128-008 - Spongent-128/128/8: 
n=128 bits, b=136 bits, c=128 bits, r=8 bits, R=70) [13]. 
Lesamnta-LW which uses AES methods as its core [11]. One 
thing to notice about Lesamnta-LW is that the S-box structure 
is the same as you would find in AES.  The authors think that it 
only requires 8.24 kGates, and has a throughput of 125Mbit/sec 
(which is five times faster than SHA-256, which also gives a 
256-bit hash): For the RAM requirements on an 8-bit processor, 
the authors estimate that Lesamnta-LW only requires 50 bytes 
of RAM [14]. 
Quark is defined in three main methods: u-Quark, d-Quark, 
and s-Quark, and uses a sponge function [15]. It can be used for 
hashing and in stream encryption. u-Quark has the lowest 
footprint and provides 64-bit security on 1379 digital gate, 
whereas s-Quark provides 112-bit security [16]. 
Keccak is a family of cryptographic sponge functions that has 
become the FIPS 202 (SHA-3) standard in 2015 [17]. The 
Keccak is based on the sponge construction, in which the 
underlying function is a permutation chosen in a set of seven 
Keccak-f permutations, denoted as Keccak-f (25, 50, 100, 200, 
400, 800, 1600) with seven different width of the permutation 
of {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64}. The Keccak can provide nice 
flexibility and good performance both in hardware and software 
with moderate implementation size and RAM consumption and 
suitable for lightweight applications.   
PHOTON is lightweight cryptography method for hashing 
and is based on an AES-type approach [10]. It can create 80-bit, 
128-bit, 160-bit, 224-bit and 256-bit hashes [10]. It takes an 
arbitrary-length input and produces a variable-length output.  
The method is defined as PHOTON-n-r-r’, where n is the 
hash size, r is the input bit rate, and r’ is the output bit rate. 
Sample hashed values for “abc” are [18]:   
 
Photon 80 signature (PHOTON-80/20/16) 
("abc") = 3151cb8f09f5a4908531 
------------ 
Photon 128 signature (PHOTON-128/16/16) 
("abc") = e1bb314c7c9ace3ea0ed6fd1d762d216 
------------ 
Photon 160 signature (PHOTON-160/36/36) 
("abc") = c11d4cd3da84bc245430ba7cf696d0092941ba58 
------------ 











The internal state is defined as t (bits), and is calculated as t=c+r 
(where c is the capacity). With PHOTON we use a sponge 
function and where we take input bits and XOR with bits taken 
from the current state. Overall there are three main phases: 
 
 Initialisation. This phase takes the input bit stream and 
breaks into r bits (and pads if required). 
 Absorbing. In this phase, for all the message blocks, we 
take r-input bits and XOR with r bits of the state, and 
interleave with a t-bit permutation function.  
 Squeezing. In this phase, we extract r bits from the current 
internal state, and apply a permutation function (P) to it. 
This will continue until the number of output bits is equal 
to the required hash size. 
 
The internal permutation function (P) is similar to AES with 12 
rounds, and which each round has the functions of (Figure 2): 
 
 AddConstants. In this function, the first column with the 
internal state is XOR-ed with round (r) and internal 
constants. 
 SubCells. In this function, the internal state is fed through 
the PRESENT S-box (Figure 5). 
 ShiftRows. In this function, the internal state cell row [i] is 
cyclically  shifted  by i positions to the left. 
 MixColumnsSerial. In this function, the internal state cell 
column is multiplied by the MDS (Maximum Distance 
Separable) matrix. 
 
Table. 2 shows a summary of lightweight hashing functions 








Figure 2 PHOTON functions [10] 
 
Table 2. lightweight hash functions [6] 


















SPONGENT-256/256/128 256  364  16  96  5  1 542 923  3 856 916  6 170 900  25 454 100  
SPONGENT-160/160/80 160  598  10  60  6  795 294  2 783 241  4 771 186  20 674 746  
S-Quark 256  1106  4 60  5  708 783  1 417 611  2 339 023  9 4270 23  
D-Quark 176  974  2 42  5  631 871  1 516 685  2 570 035  10 996 835  
Keccak[r=40,c=160] 160  752  5  45  3  58 063  162 347  278 269  1 205 627  
Keccak[r=144,c=256] 256  608  18  92  4  90 824  181 466  317 221  1 313 291  
PHOTON-160/36/36 160  764  9 39  11  620 921  1 655 364  2 793 265  11 999 914  
PHOTON-256/32/32 256  1244  4  68  10  254 871  486 629  787 896  3 105 396  
 
B. Streaming 
One of the first to show promise for a replacement for AES for 
lightweight cryptography is PRESENT [19]. It uses smaller 
block sizes and the potential for smaller keys (such as for an 80-
bit key). PRESENT users either an 80-bit (10 hex characters) or 
a 128-bit encryption key (16 hex characters). It operates on 64-
bit blocks and uses an SPN (substitution-permutation network) 
method. With SPN, as with AES (Rijndael), we operate on 
blocks of plaintext and apply a key and then use a number of 
rounds which we use substitution boxes (S-boxes) and 
permutation boxes (P-boxes). The operations used are typically 
achieved through XOR/bitwise rotation, and parts of the key are 
introduced though the rounds of operation. The decryption 
process is then the reverse of the encryption rounds, and the S-
boxes/P-boxes are reversed in their operation.  
Within Figure 3 we see an example of a single round, and 
where 8-bits of data is entered, and then EX-OR with the first 
eight bits of the key. Next the output from this operation is fed 
into an S-box which maps in the inputs to the output (for 
example 0x0 will be mapped to 0xC. After this we feed the 
output into a P-box which will scramble the bits in a defined 
way. The output of this is then fed into the next round, and 
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which will follow the same process, but this time our input is 
from the previous round, and from the next eight bits of the key. 
 
Figure 3 SPN method 
 
An S-box substitutes a small block of bits (the input of the S-
box) by another block of bits (the output of the S-box). This 
substitution should be one-to-one, to ensure invertability (hence 
decryption). In particular, the length of the output should be the 
same as the length of the input (the picture on the right has S-
boxes with 4 input and 4 output bits), which is different from S-
boxes in general that could also change the length, as in DES 
(Data Encryption Standard), for example. An S-box is usually 
not simply a permutation of the bits. Rather, a good S-box will 
have the property that changing one input bit will change about 
half of the output bits (or an avalanche effect). It will also have 
the property that each output bit will depend on every input bit 
[20]. 
Within PRESENT, we take a block of 64 bits and apply an 
80-bit or a 128-bit key. Overall it has 32 rounds (Figure 4), 
which is made up of: a round key operation; an S-box layer; and 
a P-box layer. The key round operation takes part of the key and 
EX-ORs it with the data input into the round. It then operates 
on 4x4 bit S-boxes, and which considerably cuts down on 
processing power (Figure 5). In AES we map for 16 bit inputs 
to 16-bit outputs (0x00 to 0xFF) but for PRESENT we have 4-
bit values and which map onto 16 output values (0x0 to 0xF). 
For example, an input of 0x0 would output a value of 0xC. In 
Figure 6 we see the permutation of the bits for inputs of 32 bits, 
so that Bit 1 is mapped to Bit 16. The output from the layer 
provides the output from the round. 
 
Figure 4 PRESENT method [19] 
 
 
Figure 5 sboxlayer mapping [19] 
 
 
Figure 6 pLayer mapping [19] 
 
Another contender is the super-fast XTEA method. XTEA 
(eXtended TEA) is a block cipher which uses a 64-bit block size 
and a 64-bit key. It was designed by David Wheeler and Roger 
Needham at the Cambridge Computer Laboratory, and part of 
an unpublished technical report in 1997. The amazing thing 
about XTEA is that it does its operations with just a few lines 




/* take 64 bits of data in v[0] and v[1] and 128 bits of key[0] - key[3] 
*/ 
 
void encipher(unsigned int num_rounds, uint32_t v[2], uint32_t const 
key[4]) { 
    unsigned int i; 
    uint32_t v0=v[0], v1=v[1], sum=0, delta=0x9E3779B9; 
    for (i=0; i < num_rounds; i++) { 
        v0 += (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + key[sum & 3]); 
        sum += delta; 
        v1 += (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + key[(sum>>11) & 
3]); 
    } 
    v[0]=v0; v[1]=v1; 
} 
void decipher(unsigned int num_rounds, uint32_t v[2], uint32_t const 
key[4]) { 
    unsigned int i; 
    uint32_t v0=v[0], v1=v[1], delta=0x9E3779B9, sum=delta*num_rounds; 
    for (i=0; i < num_rounds; i++) { 
        v1 -= (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + key[(sum>>11) & 
3]); 
        sum -= delta; 
        v0 -= (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + key[sum & 3]); 
    } 
    v[0]=v0; v[1]=v1; 
} 
 
Other block ciphers, too, are now being called back from 
retirement, including RC5, as they have proven to be fairly 
simple in their operation, but relatively secure. The great thing 
about RC5 is that it has a variable block size (32, 64 or 128 bits), 
and has key sizes from 0 to 2,040 bits. Along with this, it can 
have from 0 to 255 rounds. When it was first created, the 
recommended implementation was a block size of 64 bits, a 
128-bit key and 12 rounds, but, in an IoT world, this can be 
optimised to the device. 
For lightweight crypto, the NSA released SIMON in 2013, 
and which was optimized for hardware implementations. It has 
key sizes of 64, 72, 96, 128, 144, 192 or 256 bits, and block 
sizes of 32, 48, 64, 96 or 128 bits [22] and SPECK (which is 
optimized for software implementations) [23]. 
Mickey V2 is a lightweight stream cipher and was written by 
Steve Babbage and Matthew Dodd. It creates a key stream from 
an 80-bit key and a variable length initialization vector (of up 
to 80 bits). The keystream has a maximum length of 240 bits 
[24]. 
Trivium is a lightweight stream cipher and It was created 
Christophe De Cannière and Bart Preneel, and has a low 
footprint for hardware. It uses an 80-bit key, and generates up 
to 264 bits of output, with an 80-bit IV [25]. 
Grain is a Light Weight Stream Cipher and was written by 
Martin Hell, Thomas Johansson and Willi Meier. It has a 
relatively low gate count, power consumption and memory. It 
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has an 80-bit key, and has two shift registers and a non-linear 
output function [26]. 
Enocoro is a lightweight stream cipher and was defined by 
Hitachi. It has a 128-bit key and a 64-bit IV value. Along with 
this it is included in ISO/IEC 29192 International Standard for 
a lightweight stream cipher method (ISO/IEC 29192-3:2012) 
[27]. 
C. Block 
CLEFIA is a well-studied lightweight block cipher and was 
written by Taizo Shirai, Kyoji Shibutani, Toru Akishita, Shiho 
Moriai, and Tetsu Iwata, and can be implemented with 6K 
gates. It was defined by Sony, and has 128, 192 and 256 bit 
keys, and 128-bit block sizes. Along with this it is included in 
ISO/IEC 29192 International Standard for a lightweight block 
cipher method (ISO/IEC 29192-2:2012) [28]. 
RC5 ("Ron's Cipher 5"), created in 1994 by Ron L. Rivest, 
also shows great potential for a lightweight cryptography 
method. It is a block cipher which has a variable block size (32, 
64 or 128 bits), a variable number of rounds, and a variable key 
size (0 to 2,048 bits). It can thus be used to match the encryption 
to the capabilities of the device. If it is a low-powered device 
with a limited memory and a relatively small physical footprint, 
we could use a 32-bit block size and an 80-bit key, with just a 
few rounds. But we can ramp up the security if the device can 
cope with it, and use 128-bit block sizes and a 128-bit key. It 
can also be flexible, where a single change on either side can 
improve or reduce the requirements.  
 The flexibility around the key size, block size and rounds, 
supports a range of design choices, in a way that AES struggles 
with. AES, for example, uses relatively large key sizes of 128 
bits, 192 bits and 256-bits, with 128-bit block sizes. It also a 
fixed number of rounds depending on the key size, such as 10 
rounds for 128-bit encryption, 12 rounds for 192-bit encryption, 
and 14 rounds for 256-bit encryption. These requirements, for 
an IoT device, often consume considerable amounts of memory 
and processing resource, and will often have a significant effect 
on the power consumption, draining the battery resource. The 
following uses RC5/32/12/16 (32-bit blocks, 12 rounds and 16-
byte key - 128 bits): [29]. 
D. Signing 
Chaskey Cipher is a permutation-based lightweight 
cryptography method for signing messages (MAC) using a 128-
bit key. The Chaskey takes a 128-bit block using a 128-bit 
Addition-Rotation-XOR based permutation. The hardware 
implementation only requires 3,334.33 gates equivalent with an 
operating clock frequency of 1 MHz. With SHA-256 we need 
around 15,000 gates, while Keccak (SHA-3) requires 4,658 
gates [30].  
 
Message:                  hello 
Key (128 bits - 32 hex):   BD63710BAF4753D0367DBF6A875ACAAB 
Signature:                db6a554716651bc3a818e0c1d01d582d 
Encrypt (CBC):          18c381d3811319c24af6cd71af70f97f 
E. Asymmetric Encryption 
Our normal public key methods do not quite work on RFID 
devices, so let's look at the proposed method for proving that a 
RFID device is real. The method proposed by the ISO/IEC is 
ISO/IEC 29192-4:2013 includes ELLI (Elliptic Light), 
cryptoGPS [31] and ALIKE [32]. ELLI uses Elliptic Curves 
along with a Diffie-Hellman related handshake between the 
RFID tag and the RFID reader [33]. Within Elliptic Curve we 
start with a point on a curve (P) which is known. Then we 
multiply this point with a large number (ε) to produce another 
point (A) on the curve: 
 
A = ε P                                             (1) 
 
and where A will be the public key, and ε is the private key. If 
ε is large enough it is then difficult to compute ε even though 
we have A and P. Now let's look at the basics of ELLI. For this 
RFID tag contains a random value of ε (the private key), and 
the RFID reader generates a random value of λ. On creating the 
RFID tag, we calculate (Figure 7): 
 
B = ε P                                             (2) 
 
along with the signature of B which has been signed by a key 
that the RFID reader can validate. Thus the tag contains: [ε, B, 
PublicKeySign(B)]. Each time the RFID reader wants to 
validate the tag it takes its random value (λ) and computes:  
 
A = λ P                                             (3) 
 
Next the RFID reader sends A to the RFID tag. The RFID tag 
then multiplies the value of A by its private key (ε) to get C: 
 
C = ε A                                             (4) 
 
It then sends back its public key (B), the value of C and the 
signature of the public key which the reader can verify. The 
reader then computes D: 
 
D = λ B                                             (5) 
 
and compares C and D. If they are the same we have verified 
the private key. This is true as: 
 
C = ε (A) = ε (λ P)                                             (6) 
D = λ (B) = λ (ε P)                                             (7) 
 
It is secure as it uses the Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Problem 
(ECDHP). If Eve wants to produce a fake RFID tag she receives 
the challenge of: 
 
A = λ P 
 
and now must return a valid response (C), along with a public 
key which has been signed by an authority. Since Eve only has 
A and B, she cannot compute a valid response for C as she does 




Lightweight cryptography has received increasing attentions 
from both academic and industry in the past two decades. A 
large number of lightweight algorithms have been proposed 
such as PRESENT, CLEFIA, LED, KANTAN, etc. This paper 
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reviews the most popular lightweight cryptography solutions 
over resource limited devices and analyzed the strengths and 
disadvantages. This paper also gives an overview of the state-
of-the-art ultra-lightweight and IoT cryptography that could be 
used over resource-limited smart devices such as intelligent 
sensor, RFID, and so on.   
 
 
Figure 7 Abstraction of the ELLI method 
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